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BERKELEY'S SOCIAL THEORY: CONTEXT 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
BY DA YID E. LEARY* 
I. Berkeley's Social Theory and its Intellectual Background 
George Berkeley's social thought has been overlooked. The reason 
seems obvious. Berkeley has been regarded principally as a link be-
tween John Locke and David Hume. Consequently, his works relating 
to the British empirical tradition and to his immaterialism have received 
primary attention while his works dealing with ethical and public issues 
have been regarded as secondary. This has led to a distortion of Berke-
ley's own scale of priorities. He repeatedly stressed that he was primarily 
concerned with the condition of the real and concrete world which sur-
rounded him. That this real and concrete world is immaterial and is 
constituted in our ideas of it were indeed important propositions for 
Berkeley, but they were only steps toward a consistent philosophy that 
was intended to convince his readers of the essential relation of man 
to his world, society, religion, and God. Berkeley's goal was always to 
educate the public to "a Zeal for Religion and Love of their Country." 1 
He was concerned primarily with how people lived their lives, how they 
related to one another and to their God; he was concerned with their 
metaphysical beliefs largely to the extent that they bore on these issues. 
This paper is an investigation of Berkeley's social thought, particu-
larly as it is grounded upon Berkeley's quite explicit, but neglected, so-
cial theory, which is revealed in an essay written by Berkeley in 1713 
for Steele's short-lived Guardian. Originally untitled, this short essay 
has been labeled "The Bond of Society" in Luce and Jessop's critical 
edition of Berkeley's works. Its significance was noted by Harry Elmer 
Barnes in 1948, but Barnes's comment has not brought the essay the 
recognition it deserves. This is all the more unfortunate since, as Barnes 
says, Berkeley's essay is "one of the most suggestive essays in the whole 
history of social philosophy."2 
*The author would like to thank Keith Michael Baker of the University of 
Chicago for his helpful comments on the first draft of this article. 
1 Berkeley, "A Proposal for the better supplying of Churche> in our foreign 
Plantations" (1725), Works, VII, 348. All references to Berkeley's works are 
to the critical edition of his collected works: A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, eds., 
The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, 9 Vols. (New York, 1948-57). 
In the notes this source will be referred to simply as Works. 
2 H. E. Barnes, ed., An Introduction to the History of Sociology (Chicago, 
1966), 52. 
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"The Bond of Society" is a good title for this essay in which Berke-
ley's major concern is to comprehend the nature of social phenomena 
as an integral part of "the whole scope of creation. "3 The essence of 
Berkeley's argument is that there is "a certain correspondence" or 
"similitude of operation" between the natural world and the world of 
man. Just as natural philosophers now agree that natural bodies exert 
"a mutual attraction upon each other," so too, says Berkeley, can we 
observe "a like principle of attraction" in the moral world of man. In 
fact, the "social appetite in human souls is the greatest spring and source 
of moral actions"; it is the very bond of society. 
In this very brief summary the intellectual context of Berkeley's 
social theory is clearly manifest. The natural philosopher to whom 
Berkeley alludes is, of course, Sir Isaac Newton, and it is against the back-
ground of Newtonian mechanics that Berkeley analyzes social dynamics. 
The key concept in Berkeley's analysis is the "principle of attraction" 
whereby men "are drawn together in communities, clubs, families, 
friendships, and all the various species of society." Based on this funda-
mental analogy of social attraction (or "appetite") with natural gravity,' 
Berkeley sketches a model of society which can account for both the 
common sociability of man and the unique individual differences in the 
attraction among men. For instance: "As in bodies, where the quantity 
is the same, the attraction is strongest between those which are placed 
nearest to each other, so it is likewise in the minds of men, caeteris 
paribus, between those which are most nearly related." Thus does 
Berkeley account for the fact that those who habitually live closer to-
gether are more tightly bound together in the various social relations 
which we observe in the human world. 
Beyond this, Berkeley offers a further explanation of individual 
differences in the behavior of men. Individual idiosyncrasies (including 
anti-social and asocial behaviors) are explained by Berkeley as the 
results of the "private passions and motions of the soul" which "obstruct 
the operation of that benevolent uniting instinct implanted in human 
nature." These passions are analogous to the "rectilinear motions" in 
the natural world which in cooperation with "the general laws of gravi-
tation" account for the orbits of the "several great bodies which com-
pose the solar system." Just as the tendency to rectilinear (centrifugal) 
3 Berkeley, "The Bond of Society" (1713), Works, VII, 225-28. As is true 
of all of Berkeley's writings, this essay is a superb example of concise expression. 
Unquestionably it speaks for itself better than any exposition can, and so the 
reader is encouraged to consult it directly. Since the essay is very short, quota-
tions in the following discussion will not be cited. 
4 Since Berkeley thinks of man's sociability as analogous to Newton's "mu-
tual attraction" or gravity, it is interesting to note that Newton originally thought 
of gravity or attraction (especially in his alchemical experiments) as "socia-
bility." Cf. Frank E. Manuel. A Portrait of Isaac Newton (Cambridge, 1968), 68. 
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motion counteracts the pull of gravity, which by itself would draw these 
great bodies "all into one mass," so too the passions of men serve to 
balance the influence of the "social appetite in human souls." Social 
dynamics, like natural mechanics, are the result of the interaction of 
individual and common tendencies. 
This social theory is remarkable for several reasons. It is not only 
the first attempt to apply Newtonian mechanics to the analysis of social 
phenomena, but it is very possibly the first self-consciously "scientific" 
theory of social behavior. That is, it is based upon, and fulfills, the cri-
teria of Berkeley's philosophy of science. It proposes "uniform laws of 
nature" which describe the "ordinary course of things"5 ; or. in Berke-
ley's favorite metaphor for science, it provides "a grammar for the 
understanding of nature."6 The intellectual context of Berkeley's phil-
osophy of science is again Newtonian science. It was through his critique 
of Newtonian science in the Philosophical Commentaries ( 1708-09) 
that Berkeley developed a consistent understanding of what science is 
and what it offers. 7 While it is not necessary to give the details of Berke-
ley's philosophy of science, two points from that analysis will be use-
ful here. 
First, according to Berkeley, science does not preclude freedom, 
i.e., the freedom of the Spirit. The Spirit of God is radically free; the 
Spirit of Man is relatively free. God can will a change in the uniformity 
of the natural world at any time; man cannot do so, but he is free to 
will a change in the human world. 8 This fact, the freedom of man's 
spirit, is another factor which influences the social behavior of man. 
Although Berkeley does not specify the influence in "The Bond of 
Society," it is clearly the cause of the ultimate dysanalogy between the 
natural and human worlds. Man can, as he says, become "a sort of 
[moral] monster or anomalous production" despite the "reciprocal attrac-
0 Berkeley, A Treatise concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge 
(1710), Works, II, 54. 
6 Berkeley, Siris (1744), Works, V, 120. 
7 Berkeley's Philosophical Commentaries (1708-09), Works, J, 7-106, are the 
notebooks in which Berkeley laid the foundation for his later philosophical 
works. In his Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), De Motu (1721), his 
letters to Samuel Johnson (1729-30), and Siris (1744), he continued to develop 
the critique of Newtonian science which he set forth in these notebooks, but 
his basic philosophy of science was clearly delineated well before he wrote "The 
Bonds of Society" in 1713. Regarding Berkeley's philosophy of science, cf. Rich-
ard J. Brook, Berkeley's Philosophy of Science (The Hague, 1973) and Geoffrey 
James Warnock, "Science and Mathematics," in his Berkeley (Harmondsworth, 
1953), 198-212. 
s Cf. Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries, op. cit., 77 ( #626), 101 ( #850); 
Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Works, II, 69-70; and Berkeley's letter 
to Johnson (1729), Works, II, 280. Berkeley planned to present a detailed 
discussion of man's freedom in Part II of Principles of Human Knowledge, but 
he apparently lost the manuscript of that part and never rewrote it. 
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tion in the minds of man" which is "originally engrafted in the very first 
foundation of the soul" as "the great spring and source of moral actions." 
Secondly, according to Berkeley, science is not concerned merely 
with understanding reality. In fact, he did not think that science could 
give descriptions that are true in any absolute sense; rather, he felt that 
science gives descriptions which are useful, which give us "a sort of 
foresight, which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of 
life."9 Thus Berkeley's philosophy of science was explicitly pragmatic 
and aimed at the application of science. This helps explain Berkeley's 
conclusions at the end of "The Bonds of Society." When he says that 
his thoughts about the nature of social dynamics "do naturally suggest" 
several particular conclusions, he is not merely tagging on some extra-
neous considerations. Rather the three social concerns he reveals in his 
conclusions reflect the pragmatic motives he had in developing his 
social theory. Upon these concerns he hoped to shed light and have a 
practical effect. His first conclusion is that, "as social inclinations are 
absolutely necessary to the well-being of the world, it is the duty and 
interest of each individual to cherish and improve them to the benefit 
of mankind." Secondly, he concludes that "it makes a signal proof of 
the divinity of the Christian religion, that the main duty which it incul-
cates above all other is charity," which is the virtue which contributes 
most to man's sociability, which in turn is the root of man's moral good-
ness. And therefore, his third conclusion is that "our modern Free-
thinkers" who "insinuate the Christian morals to be defective" are 
gravely in error. Just as the essay as a whole gives the basic premises 
of Berkeley's social theory, his three conclusions give a pithy indication 
of his three major social concerns-the disruption of society, the crisis 
of Christian faith and virtue, and the rise of modern free-thinking. We 
shall investigate the background of these concerns in the next section. 
II. Berkeley's Social Concerns 
Berkeley's threefold concern about society, religion, and modern 
free-thinking did not develop by chance. Berkeley lived in a world 
alive with changes which were rending the very fabric of the political, 
religious, and spiritual order, and these changes were more than evident 
within the "cloistered" confines of his own life. 10 The very halls of 
Trinity College, Dublin, which he entered in 1 700 and at which he sub-
9 Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, op. cit., 54. Also cf. Siris, 
op. cit., 112. 
10 The biographical facts in .this paper are generally available and commonly 
known and therefore will not be footnoted. My sources are A. A. Luce, The 
Life of George Berkeley (New York, 1968): T. E. Jessop, George Berkeley 
(London, 1959); John Wild, George Berkeley: A Study of His Life and Philos-
ophy (Cambridge, 1936); Luce and Jessop's editorial comments throughout 
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sequently became a tutor and lecturer, still bore the marks left by the 
soldiers who had used them as a barracks. Despite the Act of Settle-
ment in 1701, the political unrest in Ireland, England, and Scotland 
was still very real. The new Hanoverian line was not dearly beloved 
by the Tories, and Jacobite sympathies and hopes were still strong. At 
the same time the political turmoils of many years-and Marlborough's 
wars over a few years-had contributed to a very sizeable national debt 
and economic instability. And this political and economic disorder was 
accompanied by various signs of "moral decay." In short, social order 
was tentative at best. 
Berkeley's concern about the state of society is reflected in a number 
of his writings before 1713. His notebooks (Philosophical Commen-
taries, 1708-09) show a preoccupation with the working out of a mo-
tivational-ethical theory upon which social order could be based. 11 In 
1709, in a letter to Sir John Percival, he reveals his knowledge of, and 
his own ruminations about, political theory. 12 These same interests are 
further developed in his three sermons on "Passive Obedience," pub-
lished in 1 712 to quiet the suspicions that he had been preaching in 
favor of the Jacobite cause. 13 However, the publication of the actual, 
rather than rumored, words of his sermons did little to win him friends 
among the Whigs. 14 Rather than quieting public controversy over his 
political affiliations, his published sermons made him politically visible 
and earned him the pains of political discrimination. Specifically, his 
implicit critique of the new Lockean theory of limited obedience to 
government made him suspect to the Whigs who subsequently kept him 
for many years from receiving any clerical preferment. But he did not 
on that account moderate his views, and he bore his situation and con-
sequent poverty as best he could. Berkeley's political involvement, there-
fore, was more than simply theoretical. 
Meanwhile, the political tensions in early eighteenth-century British 
society were supplemented by religious tensions. Though not as violent 
Works; and Colin Murray Turbayne, "Introduction," in George Berkeley's Prin-
ciples, Dialogues, and Philosophical Correspondence, ed. by C. M. Turbayne 
(Indianapolis, 1965), vii-xxxiv. 
11 These notes in Philosophical Commentaries were to be the basis of the lost 
Part II of Principles of Human Knowledge, regarding Moral Philosophy. Berke-
ley's Alciphron (1732) can be viewed as a substitution for the lost manuscript. 
12 Berkeley, "Letters," Works, VIII, 21-23. 
13 Berkeley, "Passive Obedience," Works, VI, 15-46. This work is relevant 
to our interests, particularly regarding the development of Berkeley's ethical and 
motivational ideas. 
14 Ironically, since Berkeley preached obedience to civil authority, he was 
actually arguing for the Hanoverian-Whig cause, as opposed to the Jacobite-Tory 
cause. However, he argued on very non-Whiggish grounds, and that did not 
agree well with the Whigs. Such were the insecurities of the time. 
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and bitter as before, Catholic and Protestant rivalries still existed and 
were still a factor in the continuance of political unrest. But more 
important and dreadful to Berkeley than this inter-Christian conflict 
was the new phenomenon, as he perceived it, of the disaffection of a 
significant number of people from traditional Catholic and Protestant 
beliefs and practices and the development of new forms of religion. 
From Berkeley's viewpoint, this rise of atheism and deism added further 
strains to the traditional cultural order. 
It was within this context that Berkeley was ordained an Anglican 
deacon in 1 709 and a priest in 1710. Given his religious convictions, 
his attitude toward the rise of religious infidelity and atheism is not 
surprising. Yet it has not always been sufficiently recognized that Berke-
ley's concern about the rise of "irreligion" was a major motive behind 
the development of his philosophical system. This is clearly seen in 
the numerous notations in his Philosophical Commentaries which are 
concerned with the proof of an immediately present and sustaining 
God, 15 and it is made quite explicit in the subtitle of his major work, 
A Treatise Concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge ( 1710). 
The subtitle reads: "Wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in 
the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and lrreligion, 
are inquired into."16 The final paragraphs of The Principles of Human 
Knowledge conclude that God's existence is capable of proof and that 
"after all, what deserves the first place in our studies, is the consideration 
of God, and our duty; which to promote ... was the main drift and 
design of my labours .... " Therefore, "having shewn the falseness or 
vanity of those barren speculations, which make the chief employment 
of learned men," Berkeley hopes he has been able to "dispose them to 
reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know 
and to practice is the highest perfection of human nature." 17 This was 
not just the standard pious conclusion intended for the edification of 
the public. Berkeley had tried his best to develop a philosophy which 
would help restore and heal religious belief. He had done so on a level 
of philosophical discourse which omitted specific references to the doc-
trines and the proponents of doctrines which he was combatting, but 
it is nonetheless clear that, besides outright atheism, the "barren specu-
lations" which he opposed were those of the deistic "free-thinkers." In 
particular, he must have had in mind Toland's Christianity not Mysteri-
ous ( 1696) which had brought great attention and controversy to the 
topic of rationalistic religion. Berkeley closed his Three Dialogues be-
tween Hy/as and Philonous ( 1713) with similar antideistic and anti-
15 Berkeley's stress on a God who continues to sustain and be involved with 
his creation is obviously presented in opposition to the deistic conception of a 
removed God who watches over a mechanically self-operating universe. 
16 Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, op. cit., I. 17 Ibid., 113. 
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skeptical conclusions, and he directed a number of his essays in the 
Guardian against free-thinkers and skeptics. 18 Berkeley voiced his op-
position to such "irreligion" in even more specific terms in his later 
"popular" works. 
From this brief review it should be apparent that Berkeley's con-
clusions (about the disruption of society, the crisis of Christian faith and 
virtue, and the rise of modern free-thinking) at the end of "The Bonds 
of Society" were not simply a spelling-out of the logic of that essay. We 
shall now see how the changing social context of eighteenth-century life 
prompted Berkeley to further elaborate his social theory in a number 
of writings and projects which can be viewed as theoretical and practical 
extensions of "The Bond of Society." 
III. The Elaboration of Berkeley's Social Theory 
In October 1713, just two months after he published "The Bond of 
Society," Berkeley left London for a year's stay on the Continent as 
the chaplain of the Earl of Petersborough. When he returned in 1714, 
he hoped to receive a clerical appointment, but the memory of his "Pas-
sive Obedience" was still alive, and the Whigs, who had just come into 
power, blocked Berkeley's attempts to procure a living. Despite this 
discrimination, Berkeley wrote an anonymous article in 1715 which in 
effect supported the Whig ascendency, not in order to win the favor 
of the Whigs but in order to secure social order, which was extremely 
fragile. With Jacobite rebellion an immanent threat, this article, "Advice 
to the Tories who have taken the Oaths," appeals to the Tories to ful-
fill their moral duty to respect their oaths of allegiance and their respon-
sibility to preserve public and religious order. It demonstrates Berkeley's 
continuing concern about the state of society and religion. 19 
It also develops some of the ideas set forth in "Passive Obedience'' 
and "The Bond of Society." Specifically, it presents a further develop-
ment of the argument for passive obedience to the sovereign, and it de-
scribes the role of "passion" and religion in, respectively, destroying 
and preserving the public order. Even more clearly than in Berkeley's 
1713 essay, "passion" is associated with anti-social behavior; religion, 
with the fundamental social virtues. The symbiosis of social order and 
religion, a theme which is implicit in "Passive Obedience" and "The 
18 In fact, Berkeley's gener.al purpose in the essays as a whole was to oppose 
the free-thinkers. Cf. esp. "Minute Philosophers," "Shortsightedness," "The 
Christian Idea of God," and "Immortality," all written in I 713, Works, VII, 
206-09, 210-21, 222-24. Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philo-
nous ( 1713), written in an attempt to introduce his philosophical doctrines to 
a wider audience, is found in Works, H, 163-263. 
19 "Advice to the Tories who have taken the Oaths" ( I 7 I 5), Works, VI, 
53-58. A Jacobite rebellion did break out and was suppressed in Scotland, 
Sept. I 715. 
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Bond of Society," is more clearly elaborated here. In fact, the argu-
ment turns on itself when Berkeley pleads that social order must be 
preserved in order that Christianity be saved; and Christianity must be 
saved not just because of its "truth," but also because of its "usefulness" 
-its usefulness in preserving the social order! Despite this circularity 
in argument, Berkeley's theme is worth noting since it underlines a 
conviction which received fuller treatment in many of his later works: 
the state of society and the state of religion are intimately and directly 
related. Religion, in essence, fosters the "social appetite" and also aids the 
control of "private passions" which are inimical to social welfare. Social 
order, in turn, provides a setting in which the "private passions" are 
less likely to be aroused and "social appetite" is more likely to be fulfilled. 
Before Berkeley could develop this theme, however, he needed to 
find a means to a living. After two years of fruitless search for an ap-
pointment, he left London again and began a second Continental tour, 
this time for four years as the tutor of the son of the Bishop of Clogher. 
When he returned to London in 1720, he found London once again in 
great social, political, and economic disorder. In fact, London seemed 
on the verge of collapse. The immediate cause was the bursting of 
the South Sea Bubble, the final event of a financial speculation scheme 
which led to the economic ruin of many. But Berkeley, in "An Essay 
towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain" (1721 ) , maintained that 
this particular event was only the result of a long decline in the country's 
morals and religion. Wanton licentiousness, rather than true liberty, 
had become the accustomed modus operandi; material gain had become 
the goal of all endeavor; and the simple, religious virtues upon which 
the English nation had risen were disappearing more and more each 
day. The problem was that "the passions of men" were being "violently" 
aroused by the hope of personal gain, leading to all sorts of private and 
public vices, while "public spirit, that glorious principle of all that is 
great and good," was being lost. 20 
This analysis is readily identifiable as an application of Berkeley's 
social theory. "Passion" is the father of individualism, and individual-
ism, the father of public disorder. "Social appetite" or "public spirit" is 
the source of good. Therefore, since religion fosters the "public spirit," 
the reintroduction of "a true sense of religion" is the first step that should 
be taken to reestablish the public weal. Up to this point in his argument, 
Berkeley has extended his prior discussion but added nothing new. How-
ever, this essay of 1721 is significant because it goes further. Berkeley 
proceeds to list a number of concrete, practical suggestions regarding 
how the doom of England can be avoided. The significance of these 
measures is that they are designed to accomplish two simultaneous 
20 "An Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain" (1721). Works, 
VI, 71, 79. 
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goals-to foster "public spirit" (and allay "private passions") while at 
the same time restoring economic feasibility. The specific suggestions 
are beyond our scope here, but they are well worth perusal for the in-
sight they give into Berkeley's economic and psychological acuity. Eco-
nomic improvement, Berkeley implicitly realizes, depends to a great 
extent on psychological factors. For example, whereas cynicism and 
egoism, as well as the love of luxury and public vulgarities, reduce the 
sense of social cohesion and the desire to work for the common weal, 
"simplicity of manners" and attitudes contributes to the "public spirit" 
which motivates "every man's interest to support that of the public."21 
One must be conscious of such factors and foster them while develop-
ing economic strategies. Strategies alone are not enough. Berkeley re-
turns to this implicit theme in later writings, making it much more 
explicit. 
This general analysis of the public ills and his concrete suggestions 
were not merely theoretical for Berkeley. As he continued to seek some 
kind of ecclesiastical appointment, at first in London and then in 
Dublin, where he became involved in administration and teaching at 
Trinity College, Berkeley collected his ideas into a practical scheme 
which he felt would greatly benefit the public good. Based upon his 
conviction that Christianity fosters the natural social virtues which form 
the basis of "public spirit," and that ''public spirit" is the basis of a 
healthy society, Berkeley turned his thoughts to religious education. If 
young children were properly introduced to the fullness of Christianity, 
Berkeley reasoned, society would soon be grounded again on solid 
virtues. Berkeley grew increasingly enthusiastic about the possible 
pragmatic results of religious education. However, he also became 
increasingly depressed about the "moral decay" of Great Britain. Conse-
quently, under the influence of several missionary societies, he turned his 
sight to the New World as the place to realize his plan for religious educa-
tion. In 1722 he began communicating his ideas to friends; in 1725 he 
published a fully developed "Proposal for the better supplying of 
Churches in our foreign Plantations, &c."22 
His plan was to found an ideal Christian settlement in Bermuda 
which would include a College for the education of both natives and 
settlers from the American mainland. The proposal caught the public 
imagination, was popularly discussed, and, through much effort on 
Berkeley's part, received the approval of all the necessary authorities, 
including the King and Parliament, and a pledge of £ 20,000 from 
the national Treasury. After several years of preparation, enlisting 
people interested in his scheme, Berkeley set sail to America in 
September 1728. 
21 Ibid., 82. 22 "Proposal," op. cit. 
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His plan was never realized. After a two-and-a-half-year wait in 
Rhode Island, Berkeley learned in 1731 that the necessary grant of 
money was never to be paid. Returning disappointed to London, he 
passed two more years seeking ecclesiastical preferment. While doing 
so, in 1732, he published a work he had written in America. This work, 
written in dialogue form and entitled Alciphron, or the Minute Philoso-
pher, was his longest work since Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous (1713). 23 It tied together the various strands of thought 
which he had developed since "The Bond of Society," and thus it repre-
sents the most important theoretical extension of his social philosophy 
since that essay. In it we can see the mature form of his critique of 
free-thinking and its relation to the ills of society; and his mature theory 
of social action can be culled from its pages. 
Berkeley criticizes free-thinking in Alciphron through the dialogues 
of two fictional characters who represent the third Earl of Shaftesbury 
and Bernard Mandeville. Shaftesbury, in his Characters (1711 ), had 
proposed a "high" version of free-thinking ethical doctrine; Mandeville, 
in The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices Public Benefits (1714), had 
proposed a "low" version. Berkeley wanted to contrast the deficiencies 
of both types of free-thinking approaches with the genuine "utility" of 
traditional Christianity. As in his "Advice to the Tories" (1715), 
Berkeley divides his defense of Christianity into considerations of its 
"truth" and considerations of its "usefulness," and he puts greater em-
phasis in his argument on the latter, again reflecting his primarily prag-
matic concern. 24 In fact, the central issue of the book is whether Shaftes-
23 Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), Works, III, 21-330. The 
term "Minute Philosopher" was coined by Berkeley earlier. In 1713 he wrote 
an essay on "Minute Philosophers," op. cit., in which he referred to the narrow-
ness of mind of free-thinkers who busy themselves about the "minute particulari-
ties of religion" while missing the benefit of the whole of it. The context of 
Berkeley's concern about free-thinking, whether atheistic or deistic in form, was 
basically the same in 1732 as in 1713, except that in the meantime free-thinking 
had become even more popular. In fact, it was at the height of its influence 
after the publication of Tindal's Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel 
a Republication of the Religion of Nature ( 1730). Berkeley received Tindal's 
book too late to incorporate its doctrines into his text in any specific manner, 
but his critique was thorough enough to include Tindal's work within its scope. 
The timeliness of his critique in Alciphron is attested to by the fact that this was 
Berkeley's first work to provoke an immediate public reaction from its opponents. 
24 In fact, Berkeley points out that the objects of faith are mysterious per se 
(just as the objects of science!-"force" being no less mysterious than "grace"). 
But though the "truth" of a particular religious "idea" cannot be known or dem-
onstrated, that "idea" can be shown to be "useful." E.g., take any given man 
and "do but produce in him a sincere belief of a Future State [i.e., heaven or 
hell], although it be a mystery, although it be what eye hath not seen, nor eat 
heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, he shall, nevertheless, 
by virtue of such belief, be withheld from executing his wicked project" (Alci-
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bury's system, Mandeville's system, or traditional Christianity promotes 
best the public good. 25 Berkeley, of course, proceeds to demonstrate 
that Christianity does. First, he disposes of Mandeville's ethics with 
little difficulty by uncovering the absurdity in Mandeville's contention 
that public good results when everyone seeks his own private pleasure 
(in other words, that public good comes from private vice). Both facts 
and logic oppose such an idea. He also points out the lack of apprecia-
tion for reason and freedom in Mandeville's ethics. Contrary to Mande-
ville, he maintains that the use of reason is as natural and satisfying as 
the pleasure of sense. 
Berkeley's critique of Shaftesbury is more significant because it 
provides an amplification of the social theory Berkeley presented in 
1713. At that time Berkeley had asserted that men have an inborn 
"social appetite" which is "the great spring and source of moral actions." 
Confronted with Shaftesbury, Berkeley must clarify that statement in 
order to differentiate his approach from Shaftesbury's, which speaks of 
a natural "moral sense" in man which can lead him to a virtuous life. 
If virtue is "natural," what can religion add to man's moral life? Why 
is Shaftesbury's ethics insufficient? Because, Berkeley indicates, it is 
not in fact likely to motivate men to proper behavior. Men may have 
a natural "social appetite," but they also have "private passions," and 
these latter need to be kept under control while the former is somehow 
motivated. Mere altruism is not equal to the task; one needs the en-
couragement, beliefs, and training of religion. Thus, Christianity is 
more "useful" in promoting the good of mankind. 
This argument from "utility" is only half of Berkeley's critique of the 
deists and only a part of Alciphron, but it is enough to indicate that 
the dialogues of Alciphron presuppose a more complex theory of social 
action than presented in 1 713 and that this new motivational scheme is 
an elaboration, rather than a contradiction, of the earlier theory. "Social 
appetite" is still seen as natural, but the experiences in Berkeley's life 
have made him more realistic, or pessimistic. He now sees "social ap-
petite" as fragile, needing the maintenance and strengthening of the 
religious outlook and motives. This development, however, fits within 
the structure of the 1 713 social theory. It expands the details and not 
the terms of the discussion. 26 
phron, op. cit., 303). This does not mean, of course, that he did not believe 
that Christianity was the "tme" religion and could be proven so. 
25 For Berkeley, the "public good" constituted the goal of morals. This idea 
is developed extensively in other works too; cf. ibid., 63-64. 
26 The discussion of the development of Berkeley's motivation scheme has 
been simplified here. The full story must look at the complexities already im-
plicit in his 1713 essays "Pleasures" and "Happiness," Works, VII, 193-97, 214-17, 
where Berkeley distinguishes "natural" from "phantastical" pleasures and clari-
646 DAVID E. LEARY 
As for Alciphron as a whole, it indicates that by 1732 Berkeley had 
developed his critique of free-thinking to such a point that it helped him 
clarify an old theme, the role of religion in preserving social order. 
Religious training in social virtues and religious beliefs in God's Provi-
dence, in an afterlife, and in punishment-these were now clearly seen 
as the specific facets of religion which contribute to the effective main-
tenance of public order. 27 
The publication of Alciphron stimulated a good amount of public 
controversy. As this controversy diminished in 1734, Berkeley finally 
received the appointment he had sought for so long. At the age of forty-
nine, he was made Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland. At this age and in this 
position we might expect him to retire to a comfortable country life, but 
in fact it was from this time on that the activities of Berkeley proved 
conclusively that social concerns were the central concerns in his life. 
In a position of some social power at last, Berkeley busied himself with 
his episcopal duties, began writing a series of tracts on public issues 
concerning the welfare of Ireland and the state of her economic develop-
ment, made appearances before Parliament, and inaugurated a series of 
concrete reforms in the lands under his jurisdiction. These practical 
reforms included agricultural improvements, the founding of a spinning-
school, and the creation of jobs for vagrants. The theoretical develop-
ments, which led him to plead with Parliament for certain national 
reforms, such as the creation of a National Bank, were contained in 
The Querist (1735-37) and "A Letter on the Project of a National 
Bank" ( 1737).28 
The Querist in particular is a gem of economic insight. In it Berke-
ley uncovers the psychology of poverty even further than he had in "An 
Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain" ( 1721). Again, 
as in Alciphron, the issue is motivation. How can the poor be motivated 
to work? And again it is the inculcation of the simple virtues of "hon-
esty and industry" that makes the difference. Healthy material advance-
ment is seen as dependent upon moral growth. Through the proper 
moral incentive and a judicious division of labor, Berkeley hoped to 
fulfill the goals of total employment and equitable distribution of prod-
ucts. The experiments on his own lands justified his plans and hopes 
fies the goal of man as the happiness of mankind rather than that of any in-
dividual. 
27 These are not new ideas for Berkeley, but they are newly integrated into 
the discussion of social action. 
28 The Querist ( 1735-37) and "A Letter on the Project of a National Bank" 
(1737), Works, VI, 105-53, 185-88. It is important to stress that Berkeley's 
social activism was not simply a function of his new role as Bishop. The social 
"experiments" he tried on his own lands, the jobs he provided, and his door-to-
door solicitude for his people were far beyond the line of duty. 
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for reform, but he was unable to effect as great a change on the national 
scene as he wished. 
Berkeley remained busy with these and other practical social con-
cerns, and his pen continued to move, until his death in 1753.29 In 
fact, as bishop and member of Parliament, Berkeley took particular care 
to comment and give advice regarding a variety of issues. "A Discourse 
addressed to Margistrates and Men in Authority" ( 1738) was directed 
to magistrates and members of Parliament; letters were sent to the 
Anglican and Roman Catholic clergy counselling civil obedience during 
the Jacobite rebellion in 17 45; a further "Word to the Wise" was ad-
dressed to the Roman Catholic clergy in 1749; and "Maxims concern-
ing Patriotism" appeared in 1750.30 In addition to these writings, 
Berkeley's sermons contain significant material related to the explica-
tion of his social philosophy.31 However, it is unnecessary for us to 
investigate in detail any of these writings now. We have reviewed them 
quite enough to document our contention that Berkeley's life and work 
were dominated by his social concerns and that his understanding of 
social reality, as originally set forth in "The Bond of Society," was theo-
retically elaborated and practically applied in subsequent years. 
IV. Conclusion 
In 1713, when Berkeley first presented his social theory in "The 
Bond of Society," he was concerned about the disruption of society, the 
crisis of Christian faith and virtue, and the rise of modem free-thinking. 
Berkeley presented these concerns as only loosely related. Christianity 
was to be commended-in fact, considered "divine"-for encouraging 
sociability, and free-thinkers were to be considered wrong for accusing 
Christianity of opposing friendship. Christianity was good; free-thinking, 
bad. This much was clear, but there was no systematic explication of the 
various relationships between society, religion, and free-thinking. In the 
years following 1713 Berkeley analyzed and described these relationships 
29 For example, in response to the epidemics of 1739 and 1740, Berkeley be-
gan several years of experimentation which resulted in his infamous, but very 
sincere, advocacy of tar-water as a medicinal cure-all that could be readily avail-
able to the public. Vol. 5 of Works contains Berkeley's numerous writings which 
attempted to popularize this remedy; cf. esp. Siris (1744), 27-164. Another 
practical project Berkeley undertook was to raise his own militia in 17 45 to 
oppose renewed Jacobite rebellion. Cf. Luce, The Life of George Berkeley, op. 
cit., 177. 
30 All of the writings referred to can be found in Works, VI. It was rare for 
an Anglican Bishop to address Roman Catholics, and even rarer to get a positive 
response as Berkeley did. 
31 Cf. esp. "On the Will of God" (1751), Works, VIII, 129-138. 
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much more completely, continuing to use the basic conceptual dichot-
omy between "social appetite" and "private passions" and developing 
a more refined understanding of the role of learning and motivation in 
social life. Through this analysis, Berkeley came to define in much 
greater detail the factors involved in the positive relation between 
Christianity and social order, and he expanded his critique of free-think-
ing to the point where he could explain to his own satisfaction the fac-
tors involved in the negative relation between free-thinking and social 
order. In both cases, the crucial factor was motivation; and in both 
cases, the common concern was social order. 
This concern with social order was more than purely intellectual. 
Having used the conceptual tools of his social theory to analyze the 
different kinds of social dynamics motivated by Christianity and free-
thinking, Berkeley tried to put his theoretical understanding to practical 
use. First he suggested a program of moral-economic reforms, and then 
he worked diligently to implement his scheme of religious education. 
But it was not until he had a position of social power that he could 
fully translate his theory into practice. And this he did, to the best 
of his ability. 
The major purpose of this paper has been to show that Berkeley had 
a social theory, that this social theory arose within a definable social and 
intellectual context, and that it provided the basis for theoretical and 
practical elaboration in a number of later writings and projects in Berke-
ley's life. In particular, we have seen that the social context of Berke-
ley's own life provided the pragmatic motivation to develop, and to con-
tinue to develop, his model of society and social dynamics while his 
critique of Newtonian science provided the intellectual context in which 
that model was articulated. 
However compelling the demonstration of these theses has or has 
not been to the individual reader, this paper should at least have made 
it possible to view Berkeley's works from a perspective different from 
the traditional one. Specifically, it has suggested that there is a unity 
among what are usually considered Berkeley's "minor" and "occasional" 
pieces, and it has implied that Berkeley was much more consistently 
concerned with social theory (and the application of social theory) than 
has generally been acknowledged. Berkeley was not an idle, solitary, 
dreaming philosopher, a stereotype which still seems extant though it 
has been attacked in the literature. Nor was he simply a link between 
Locke and Hume. He was an open-eyed observer of, and participant 
in, the world in which he lived, and his response to that world motivated 
his philosophical concerns. Even his Essay towards a New Theory of 
Vision (1709), which we did not discuss in the text and which may 
seem to be purely theoretical, served also to establish a foundation for 
his applied philosophy, i.e., his Christian apologetics and his social 
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theory. 32 And his most famous work, A Treatise concerning The Prin-
ciples of Human Knowledge ( 1710), served the same purpose. Indeed, 
after perusing his entire collected works, it is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion-which Berkeley himself voiced on several occasions-that his 
central concern was always to educate his fellow countrymen to be 
"good Christians and loyal subjects. "33 In this endeavor, his analysis of 
social dynamics played an essential role. 
University of New Hampshire. 
32 New Theory of Vision ( 1709), Works, I. 161-236, established the basis of 
Berkeley's radically empirical philosophy upon which he based his philosophy 
of science, his proof of the ex,istence of God, and his social theory. The purpose 
of Berkeley's theory of vision is made quite explicit in his later "popularization," 
The Theory of Vision Vindicated, the full title of which is The Theory of Vision 
or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity 
Vindicated and Explained ( 1733), Works, I, 249-76. 
33 "Passive Obedience," op. cit., 15. 
